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NOTE
THE UNREASONABLENESS OF REQUIRING A
WARRANT FOR SEARCHES OF NON-RESIDENT
ALIENS IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY: United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez
INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,' the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that a non-resident alien may invoke the fourth
amendment to challenge the reasonableness of a search conducted
in a foreign country.' Additionally, the court held that the search in
Mexico was constitutionally unreasonable because the United
States agents did not obtain a search warrant from a U.S. Magis-
trate.3 With the explosive international war on drugs emerging, the
Verdugo-Urquidez decision comes when the question whether, and
to what extent, the fourth amendment binds U.S. government activ-
ities directed against foreign nationals, is of heightened
significance.
This Note explains how and why the fourth amendment has been
erroneously extended to foreign nationals in foreign countries. To
accomplish this task, this Note first explains how the Verdugo-Ur-
quidez majority misapplied the joint venture doctrine.4 Second, this
Note examines the history of the U.S. Constitution and the fram-
ers' intention that it establish a social contract between the United
I. 856 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, (U.S. No. 88-1353). On February 28,
1990, after this article was completed, the Ninth Circuit decision was reversed by the U.S.
Supreme Court. For more details about the reversal, see upra notes 165-177 and accompa-
nying text.
2. Id.
3. Id. "Since the DEA obtained no warrant to make that search, and because exigent
circumstances were lacking, the search was unlawful under the fourth amendment." Id. at
1230.
4. See infra notes 26-33 and accompanying text.
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States government and the people of the United States.' Third, this
Note analyzes the specific language of the fourth amendment in
determining who are "the people" it was meant to protect.6 Fourth,
this Note explains why requiring U.S. law enforcement officials to
obtain a warrant from a U.S. magistrate prior to searching a non-
resident alien's foreign home is unreasonable.7 Finally, the author
proposes a standard for searches abroad involving foreign nationals'
property.8
I. FACTS OF Verdugo-Urquidez
Since the late 1970s, the Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) was aware that Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez was en-
gaged in drug smuggling.9 The DEA obtained a warrant for
Verdugo-Urquidez's arrest after receiving a tip that he planned to
smuggle tons of marijuana into the United States." Unable to lo-
cate him in the United States, the United States Marshal's Service
contacted Mexican law enforcement officials, who informed the ser-
vice that Verdugo-Urquidez could be arrested by Mexican police in
Mexico, if there was an outstanding U.S. warrant for his arrest."'1
In January 1986, Mexican officers arrested Verdugo-Urquidez,
then transported him to the U.S.-Mexico border where marshals
placed him under arrest. 2
After the DEA agents took custody of Verdugo-Urquidez, they
discussed the possibility of searching his Mexican homes." The
DEA believed that a search of Verdugo-Urquidez's Mexicali resi-
dence would disclose cash proceeds from his drug dealings, as well
as drug ledgers and phone books listing the names and addresses of
his associates. 4 The DEA also hoped a search would disclose infor-
mation relevant to the investigation of the torture-murder of DEA
Special Agent Enrique Camarena Salazar. 5
The DEA contacted the Director General of the Mexicali Fed-
5. See infra notes 34-54 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 55-70 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 104-120 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 121-164 and accompanying text.
9. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1215.
10. Id. at 1215, 1216.
II, Id. at 1216.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. Verdugo-Urquidez, in a separate prosecution, was convicted of murdering Spe-
cial Agent Enrique Camarena Salazar. For a discussion of the conviction of Verdugo-Ur-
quidez in the Camarena matter, see Shannon, Desperados, TIME, Nov. 7, 1988, at 84.
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eral Judicial Police (MFJP), asking him to authorize the search."6
The Director agreed. He instructed the DEA to inform the local
MFJP commandante in Mexicali that the search had been author-
ized and that the MFJP officers were to assist the DEA in con-
ducting the searches.17 Upon arriving in Mexicali, the DEA agents
relayed the Director's statements to the Mexicali MFJP com-
mandante who verified this authorization with his superior officer.
After assuring the DEA agents that everything was fine, the com-
mandante double-checked the authorization with the official repre-
sentative of the Mexicali Attorney General in Mexico. After doing
so, the commandante agreed to help in the search. Before leaving
the MFJP office, the commandante informed the DEA agents that
they were allowed to take any documentary evidence they found
back to the United States.1
With the assistance of several MFJP officers, the DEA agents
searched Verdugo-Urquidez's Mexicali residence, and a house
owned by Verdugo-Urquidez in San Felipe, Baja California. Dur-
ing the search of the Mexicali residence, a tally sheet was found
which listed the amounts of marijuana that Verdugo-Urquidez had
smuggled into the United States.1 9
At the district court level, the court suppressed the introduction
of the tally sheet as evidence. 0 The district court could find no
precedent addressing the question "whether the Fourth Amend-
ment applies to a foreign search of a foreign national."21 Neverthe-
less, the district court concluded it was likely that the fourth
amendment was intended to protect an alien, already in custody in
the United States, from searches for the express purpose of ob-
taining evidence relevant to the pending prosecution. Since the
agents had not secured a warrant from a U.S. district court, the
court held the searches were unconstitutional.22
16. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1226.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1226.
19. Id. at 1217.
20. Id.
21. 5 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 229 (June 1989). The district court's framing of
the issue was somewhat broader- "whether the Fourth Amendment applies to a foreign
search of a foreign national conducted as a joint venture by the United States and foreign
officials". The "joint venture" doctrine was expounded in Stonehill v. United States, 405
F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1968). For more on the "joint venture" doctrine and the majority's appli-
cation of it to this case see infra notes 26-33.
22. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1217. The district court also found that the execu-
tion of the searches was unreasonable under the fourth amendment because: (I) the searches
were conducted primarily at night; (2) the agents did not prepare contemporaneous invento-
ries of the seized items; and (3) the searches were excessively general in scope. Id.
1990]
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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed by a divided vote. 3
The majority concluded that the protection of the fourth amend-
ment extended to the government's search of the Mexicali resi-
dence. The court reasoned that "since the DEA did not obtain a
search warrant, and because exigent circumstances were lacking, 4
the search was unlawful under the fourth amendment [and] the
evidence obtained in that search was properly suppressed."25
II. THE Verdugo-Urquidez MAJORITY'S MISAPPLICATION OF THE
JOINT VENTURE DOCTRINE*
The Verdugo-Urquidez majority began their analysis by conced-
ing that the issue of whether the fourth amendment applies to a
foreign national whose foreign residence has been searched by U.S.
law enforcement officers had never been answered by the Supreme
Court, nor resolved by any Circuit Court of Appeals.26 Further-
more, the majority observed that "neither the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution nor the exclusionary rule of evi-
dence . . . is applicable to the acts of foreign officials." '27 However,
the majority stated that "the Fourth Amendment could apply to
raids by foreign officials . . . if Federal agents so substantially par-
ticipated in the raids so as to convert them into joint ventures be-
tween the United States and foreign officials." 2 The majority then
found that the DEA agents' activities were sufficiently substantial
to bring the case within the scope of this "joint venture" doctrine. 9
23. In a vigorous dissent, Judge Wallace said that the fourth amendment does not
apply to the search of a foreign residence belonging to a foreign national. Id. at 1230. Ac-
cording to Judge Wallace, with whom the author agrees, the protections of the fourth
amendment are limited, by their terms, to "the people," a class that does not include foreign
nationals with respect to searches in foreign countries. See infra notes 57-70 and accompany-
ing text.
24. Exceptions to the warrant requirement arise when immediate action is required
and it would be unreasonable to secure a warrant. Examples include cases involving a "hot
pursuit," see, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); searches incident to a lawful
arrest, see, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); and seizure of evidence in
plain view, see, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
25. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1230.
* The author wishes to acknowledge Judge Wallace's dissent as the primary source for
his criticisms of the majority's opinion.
26. Id. at 1217.
27. Id. at 1224 (citing Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 960 (1969)). "Because the fourth amendment does not itself require
exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence, and because excluding reliable evidence will not
force foreign officers to abide by the norms of the fourth amendment, the exclusionary rule
has no application to searches conducted solely by a foreign government."
28. Id. (quoting Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738, 743 (1968)).
29. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1228. Along with the facts stated in supra sec. I,
the Verdugo-Urquidez majority relied upon the following:
[Vol. 20
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Prior to Supreme Court decisions holding that the fourth amend-
ment applied to state agencies through the fourteenth amend-
ment,30 the purpose of the "joint venture" doctrine was to deter-
mine "whether federal officials so substantially participated in a
raid by state officials as to convert the raid into a joint venture
between state and federal officials subject to the provisions of the
fourth amendment."31 Later, the substantial participation inquiry
was held to be "equally pertinent in determining whether federal
officials so substantially participated in a raid by foreign officials as
to convert it into a joint venture between the United States and the
foreign government and therefore subject to the provisions and
sanctions of the fourth amendment."32 In extending the joint ven-
ture doctrine to this case, the Verdugo-Urquidez majority disre-
garded that fact that the joint venture doctrine has never been ex-
tended to activities directed against foreign nationals. 3 Verdugo-
a team of between ten to fifteen MFJP officers, [four] DEA agents, and Com-
mandante Salazar drove to [Verdugo-Urquidez's] Mexicali residence . . . Com-
mandante Salazar stationed some of his officers around the perimeter of the house
and, while the DEA agents waited in the street, an entry team composed entirely of
MFJP officers entered the house. While the MFJP officers conducted a security
sweep, the DEA agents entered the house but they did not search the house at this
time.
Because it was already late and because San Felipe was two hours away, Com-
mandante Salazar and [DEAl Agent Bowen decided to drive there and search the
San Felipe house first. The Commandante left behind a force of four or five officers
who were instructed to secure the Mexicali residence, but . . . not to search it until
he and the DEA agents returned. . .The district court found that most of the MFJP
officers stood a perimeter watch while the DEA agents searched the house over a
two-hour period . . . During this search, the items were segregated depending upon
which agency seized them. At the conclusion of the search . . . seized items were
turned over to the DEA agents. The MFJP officers seized several weapons, as well
as a 1984 Grand Marquis and some other motor vehicles.
The commandante and the DEA then returned to the Mexicali residence . . . and
. . . conducted a room by room search of the Mexicali house. The DEA agents
seized evidence thought relevant, while the MFJP officers brought documents they
found to Agent Bowen, who decided whether the DEA wanted them. Again the
seized items were segregated based on which agency found them, although all the
seized documents were placed in the DEA agent's car. And, as in the San Felipe
search, the MFJP kept all weapons they found. At around 3:00 or 4:00 a.m., Com-
mandante Salazar grew tired of the search . . . [and he] placed all the remaining
documents in a briefcase and handed the briefcase to Agent Bowen. Commandante
Salazar told Agent Bowen to take all the documents and sort through them later
because it was late and he wanted the search to end. Agent Bowen placed the brief-
case in the DEA's car and the MFJP and DEA agents left the Mexicali house.
Id. at 1226-27.
30. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); and Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206
(1960).
31. Stonehill, 405 F.2d at 743.
32. Id.
33. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927); Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74
(1949); Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1967); and Birdsell v. United States,
1990]
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Urquidez was a foreign national.
III. THE FRAMERS' DESIGN OF THE CONSTITUTION AS A SOCIAL
CONTRACT
To fully appreciate why the majority's decision in Verdugo-Ur-
quidez is erroneous, it is necessary to understand the underlying
intent of the fourth amendment and to determine who it was
designed to protect. To do so, it is imperative to understand the
framers' vision of the Constitution.34 For the purpose of this analy-
sis, what is required by the Constitution must be distinguished from
that which is desirable as a matter of social policy.35
Traditionally, the Constitution was viewed as a social contract or
compact between the people of the United States and their govern-
ment B.3  This compact creates reciprocal rights and duties between
each of the parties.37 The thrust of this compact/social contract
theory is that the people3" of the United States allow the govern-
ment to exercise substantial authority over them. In exchange, the
government, in exercising this authority, agrees that its authority
may be limited by the Constitution.3"
As Judge Wallace's dissent in Verdugo-Urquidez pointed out, in
the pre-constitution era, "the 'compact' or 'social contract' concept
of government pervaded American political philosophy, both in the-
ory and in practice."4 For instance, in 1620, the Pilgrims enacted
the Mayflower Compact, in which they proclaimed that "'We...
solemnly and mutually . . . covenant and combine ourselves to-
gether into a civil Body Politick for our better Ordering and Preser-
vation.' ""' After the American Revolution, Americans continued to
346 F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1965).
34. When the founding fathers drafted the Constitution, they did not envision exten-
sive foreign involvements. Ragosta, Aliens Abroad: Principles for the Application of Consti-
tutional Limitations to Federal Actions, 17 N.Y. J. INT'L L. & POL. 287, 288 (1985).
35. Stephan, Constitutional Limits on International Rendition of Criminal Suspects,
20 VA. J. INT'L L. 777, 778 (1980). In considering this, Chief Justice Marshall's admonition
should be kept in mind that "we must never forget that it is a constitution we are ex-
pounding." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
36. See the FEDERALIST Nos. 39, 43 and 44 (J. Madison); see also id. No. 22 (A.
Hamilton).
37. Id.
38. See U.S. CONST. preamble. "We the People of the United States . . . do ordain
and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."
39. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1218.
40. Id. at 1231 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
41. Id. (citing Mayflower Compact, November 11, 1620, reprinted in SOURCES OF
OUR LIBERTIES: DOCUMENTARY ORIGINS OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION AND BILL OF RIGHTS 60 (Perry ed. 1954)) [hereinafter SOURCES OF OUR
[Vol. 20
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view government as a compact between the people and their respec-
tive states. 2
When the framers drafted the Constitution, they understood it to
be a compact or social contract.4 Likewise, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly proclaimed its understanding of the Constitution as a
compact between the people of the United States and its govern-
ment. For example, in Chisholm v. Georgia,4 Chief Justice Jay
announced that every state constitution "is a compact . . . and the
constitution of the United States is likewise a compact made by the
people of the United States to govern themselves."4 In McCulloch
v. Maryland, 46 Chief Justice Marshall proclaimed that "[t]he gov-
ernment of the Union . . .is, emphatically and truly, a government
of the people . . .. [i]t emanates from them. Its powers are
granted by them, and ... for their benefit."' 7
Viewed in this light, a fundamental principle of the Constitution
becomes apparent: one can make no claim of entitlement to the
rights guaranteed by the Constitution without also assuming cer-
tain obligations to the United States Government.48 It follows that
for Verdugo-Urquidez to claim a right of protection under the
fourth amendment from an unreasonable search and seizure, he
must have assumed some reciprocal obligation to the United States.
Verdugo-Urquidez, a foreign national residing in a foreign country,
has not done this.
IV. THE Verdugo-Urquidez MAJORITY'S EMPHASIS ON MAN'S
NATURAL RIGHTS
The Verdugo-Urquidez majority believed that the social contract
theory was only part of the philosophical theology reflected in the
LIBERTIES].
42. 852 F.2d at 1232 (Wallace, J. dissenting). Constitution of Massachusetts, October
29, 1780, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 41, at 373. For example, in
the Preamble to the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, the people proclaimed "The body
politic is formed by a voluntary association of individuals: it is a social compact, by which
the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole people, that all
shall be governed by certain laws for the common good." Id.
43. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1231 (Wallace, J. dissenting).
44. 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793).
45. Id. at 471.
46. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
47. Id. at 404.
48. See Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning,
23 YALE L.J. 16, 30-44 (1913). Hohfeld advocates that rights and duties are best analyzed
not as moral absolutes owed to or demanded from the whole world, but rather as different
aspects of bilateral relationships between particular parties.
1990]
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Constitution and the Bill of Rights. The majority was more influ-
enced by the notion that Americans of the revolutionary era also
held a deeply-felt belief in the "natural rights of man."49 For this
proposition, the majority chiefly relies upon the Declaration of In-
dependence, with its reference to "the laws of nature" and "inalien-
able rights."5
Viewing the compact and natural rights theories as mutually ex-
clusive, as the majority did, ignores the interrelationship between
the two. The framers incorporated the concept of natural rights
into the social compact scheme, embodying these rights in the Con-
stitution.51 Hence, while liberties listed in the Bill of Rights were
perceived by the framers as reflecting man's natural rights, they
also recognized that the Constitution formed a compact among the
people of the United States to sacrifice some measure of these natu-
ral rights in order to create a central government capable of pre-
serving the rest.52  Furthermore, rather than enhancing the
Verdugo-Urquidez majority's reliance on natural rights as a source
for constitutional extension, a reading of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence tends to fortify the compact theory. To this end, the Dec-
49. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1219-20 (citing The Declaration of Independence
(U.S. 1776), reprinted in I B. SCHWARTZ. THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
251-52 (1972)); Vermont Declaration of Rights (1777), reprinted in 1 B. SCHWARTZ, supra,
at 319. "All government ought to be instituted and supported, for the security and protection
of the community, as such, and to enable the individuals who compose it, to enjoy their
natural rights, and the other blessings which the Author of existence has bestowed upon
man." See also II. J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW I (1827) "The absolute
rights of individuals may be resolved into the right of personal security, the right of personal
liberty, and the right to acquire and enjoy property. These rights have been justly considered,
and frequently declared, by the people of this country, to be natural, inherent, and unalien-
able." III B. SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES:
RIGHTS OF THE PERSON (Volume 1) 170 (1968). Professor Schwartz explained that the dom-
inant' conception when the framers wrote was that stated in Blackstone: "By the absolute
rights of individuals, we mean those which are so in their primary and strictest sense; such as
would belong to their persons merely in a state of nature, and which every man is entitled to
enjoy, whether out of society, or in it." Id. at 170 [emphasis in original].
50. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1219 (citing The Declaration of Independence
(U.S. 1776), reprinted in I B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
251-52 (1971)).
51. Henkin, Rights: American and Human, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 405, 408 (1979). For
descriptions of the framers' views of natural rights and government, see BERNS, THE CONSTI-
TUTION AS THE BILL OF RIGHTS IS, IN HOW DOES THE CONSTITUTION SECURE RIGHTS?
(Goldwin & Shambra ed. 1985). Natural rights theory is manifested in the Constitution's
first ten amendments, the Bill of Rights. When the Constitution was originally proposed in
1789, it lacked limitations on governmental encroachment on the rights of individuals.
Therefore, as a price of their support, the antifederalists extracted promises that the Consti-
tution would be amended to provide for a specific list of individual rights. See also supra
note 49 and accompanying text.
52. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1232 (Wallace, J., dissenting, citing SOURCES OF
OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 41, at 418).
[Vol. 20
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laration of Independence declares, "In order to secure these rights,
governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers
from the consent of the governed."' 53 Applying their notion of "nat-
ural law," the Verdugo-Urquidez majority failed to follow a time-
honored tenet first laid down in Marbury v. Madison, requiring
judges to recognize that "the United States is entirely a creature of
the Constitution. Its powers and authority have no other source."5 '
V. WHO ARE THE PEOPLE TO WHOM THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
APPLIES?
Before one can claim the benefit of a law, one must be within the
class of people the law was intended to protect.5 To this end, the
fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describ-
ing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized .56
"By its express terms, the rights set forth in the this amendment
are secured to 'the people.' -5 "The People" referred to in the
fourth amendment are those referred to in the Constitution's Pre-
amble,5 8 who endowed the federal government with certain enumer-
ated powers. 59 The Supreme Court has continually reiterated that
"the language of the Constitution, where clear and unambiguous,
must be given its plain evident meaning.
The Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its
words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as dis-
tinguished from technical meaning; where the intention is clear
there is no room for construction and no excuse for interpolation
53. The Declaration of Independence % 2 (U.S. 1776).
54. U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 176-80 (1803).
55. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Barlow v.
Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
56. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
57. 856 F.2d at 1231 (Wallace J., dissenting).
58. The Preamble states in full: "We the People of the United States, in order to form
a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common
defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our
posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America" (em-
phasis added).
59. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1231 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
60. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 8 n.7 (1957) (citing Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat.
213, 302-03 (1827)).
1990]
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or addition. . .The fact that an instrument drawn with such me-
ticulous care and by men who so well understood how to make
language fit their thought does not contain any such limiting
phrase . . . is persuasive evidence that no qualification was
intended.6"
Because "the people" in the fourth amendment are only "the
people of the United States," Verdugo-Urquidez is entitled to the
protection of the fourth amendment only if he can be classified as
one of "the people" of the United States."2 However, the Verdugo-
Urquidez majority did not read the phrase "the right of the people
to be secure" as a limit on the class of people to whom the amend-
ment applies. 3
VI. VERDUGO-URQUIDEZ IS NOT ONE OF "THE PEOPLE" TO
WHOM THE FOURTH AMENDMENT EXTENDS
The fourth amendment to the Constitution was never meant to
apply to a person in Verdugo-Urquidez's situation. Verdugo-Ur-
quidez is not a citizen. He does not reside in the United States. The
search of his house occurred in a foreign country. However, the
Verdugo-Urquidez majority concluded that under the fourth
amendment, Verdugo-Urquidez could have evidence suppressed
which was obtained in a search conducted in Mexico by United
States agents with the express permission and cooperation of the
Mexican government."
The Verdugo-Urquidez majority noted that "[w]hen the govern-
ment reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield
which the Bill of Rights . . . provide[s] to protect his life and lib-
erty should not be stripped away just because he happens to be in
another country." 8 Further, the Verdugo-Urquidez court stated
that "the Constitution of the United States is in force . . . wher-
ever and whenever the sovereign power of that government is
exerted."""
61. United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731-32 (1931) (citations omitted).
62. League v. DeYoung, 52 U.S. (II How.) 184, 203 (1850). "The Constitution of the
United States was made by, and for the protection of, the people of the United States." Id.
at 202.
63. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1223. The majority reasoned that "the language of
the amendment does not so limit 'people' and we will not insert qualifying language into the
amendment to limit its application in such a fashion." Id.
64. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1230 (Wallace J., dissenting). See also supra
notes 14-17. .
65. Verdugo-Urquidez, at 1217 (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957)).
66. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1218 (citing Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298,
[Vol. 20
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From one set of Supreme Court cases holding that United States
citizens have constitutional rights abroad, 7 and another set holding
that aliens present within the United States' are entitled to some
constitutional rights against certain actions taken by U.S. officials
in this country,68 the Verdugo-Urquidez majority concluded that a
non-resident alien is entitled to fourth amendment protection
against United States officials on foreign soil.6 9
This holding is not only unprecedented, it also runs counter to
the fact that when the Supreme Court extended Constitutional pro-
tections beyond United States citizens, the Court vehemently stated
that "it was the alien's presence within its territorial jurisdiction
that gave the Judiciary power to act."7
VII. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMItATIONS: PROTECTION FOR U.S.
CITIZENS ABROAD AND FOR ALIENS WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
Although the Constitution is in force wherever and whenever the
sovereign power of the United States is exerted, it does not follow
that the Constitution, by being in force, imposes the same rules in
every time and place.71 It "contains grants of power and limitations
which, in the nature of things, are not always and everywhere ap-
plicable. ' 72 Thus, while aliens enjoy some constitutional protection
within the United States," it does not follow that they enjoy the
same protection with respect to our federal government's activities
abroad .74
312 (1922)).
67. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1933). In
Balzac, the Supreme Court recognized that in territories where the United States is sover-
eign, the Constitution is in force. Id. at 312.
68. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (extending the fourteenth amend-
ment to resident aliens because that amendment is not confined to the protection of citizens
but rather is universal in its scope); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953)
(a resident alien is a "person" within the meaning of the fifth amendment); Wong Wing v.
United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1986) (all persons within the territory of the United
States are protected by the fifth and sixth amendments).
69. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1230 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
70. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 771 (1950).
71. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922).
72. Id.
73. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 770-71. For example, the Supreme Court has
steadily enlarged the right against executive deportation of aliens who are probationary resi-
dents except upon full and fair hearing. Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese Immigrant
Case), 189 U.S. 86 (1903); Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U.S. 460 (1912); Tisi v. Todd,
264 U.S. 131 (1923); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1944); Wong Yang Sung v. Mc-
Grath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950). And since 1886, the Supreme Court has extended to resident
aliens the constitutional guarantee of due process of law of the fourteenth amendment. Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
74. Stephan, supra note 35, at 780.
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This constitutional limitation is underscored by the cases that
distinguish between the constitutional rights of aliens seeking ad-
mission into the United States and those aliens already present in
the United States. As to the former, the Supreme Court has ruled
that an alien seeking admission to the United States is accorded no
constitutional rights. 5 In other Supreme Court cases, specific
amendments have been expressly denied to non-resident aliens.7 1
When considering the extension of fourth amendment rights to
aliens, residency within the United States is important in the con-
text of the compact theory.77
Once an alien lawfully enters and resides in this country he be-
comes invested with the rights, except those incidental to citizen-
ship,78 guaranteed by the Constitution to all people within our
borders. Correlatively, 'an alien owes a temporary allegiance to
the government of the United States, and he assumes duties and
obligations which do not differ materially from those of native
born or naturalized citizens.'7 9
The Supreme Court has also acknowledged that "the Govern-
ment's obligation of protection is correlative with the duty of loyal
support inherent in the citizen's allegiance."80 Based on this duty of
loyalty, the court has distinguished between the rights of its citizens
and the rights of nonresident aliens complaining of allegedly uncon-
stitutional actions by agents of the United States abroad.81 It fol-
lows that the dissent in Verdugo-Urquidez correctly realized that
some allegiance to the United States, as evidenced by citizenship or
residency, is the "consideration" for receiving the protection of the
Bill of Rights against the extraterritorial actions of the United
States officials.82 Therefore, since Verdugo-Urquidez is neither a
United States citizen nor an alien residing within the United
75. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
76. United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904); Kwong Hai Chen
v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953). "Excludable aliens ... are not within the protection of the
fifth amendment." Id. at 600.
77. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1236 (Wallace, J., dissenting). See also supra
notes 34-46.
78. For example, the Constitution protects the privileges and immunities only of citi-
zens, U.S. CONST. amend. 14, § 1, art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; and the right to vote only of citizens,
amend. 15, 19, 24, 26. It requires that representatives have been citizens for seven years, art.
I, § 2, cl. 2, and senators citizens for nine, art 1. § 3, cl. 3, and that the president be a
"natural born citizen," art. II, § I, cl. 5.
79. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1236 (Wallace, J. dissenting, quoting Eisler v.
United States, 170 F.2d 273, 279 (D.C. Cir. 1948)).
80. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 334 U.S. at 770.
81. Id.
82. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1236 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
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States, he has not assumed any reciprocal obligations to the United
States government, as required by the compact, that would enable
him to enjoy all of the rights guaranteed to "the people" of the
United States by its Constitution.8"
This does not mean that Verdugo-Urquidez is not entitled to
some of the protections of the Constitution. As Justice Harlan
stated, "the proposition is, of course, not that the Constitution 'does
not apply' overseas, but that there are provisions in the Constitution
which do not necessarily apply in all circumstances in every foreign
place."84 For Verdugo-Urquidez's obligation to stand trial in the
United States for alleged violations of our narcotics laws, he is enti-
tled to a fair judicial trial. Even though Verdugo-Urquidez is a
non-resident alien, he is still entitled to fifth and sixth amendment
protection. 3 This is because the fifth amendment, by its express
language, applies to "all persons"86 and the sixth amendment's lan-
guage commands that in all prosecutions "the accused ' 87 shall en-
joy the right to a fair trial. However, this does not mean that
Verdugo-Urquidez is therefore entitled to the protection of the
fourth amendment. The fourth amendment's language, as distinct
from the language of the fifth and sixth amendments, is expressly
limited to "the people." 88 The Verdugo-Urquidez majority, how-
ever, believed "it would be odd indeed to acknowledge that
Verdugo-Urquidez is entitled to due process under the fifth amend-
ment, and to a fair trial under the sixth amendment . ..and deny
him the protection from unreasonable searches and seizures af-
forded under the fourth amendment." '89 Yet, at the same time, they
did not interpret the phrase "the right of the people to be secure,"
83. Id. at 1237.
84. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. I, 74 (1957) (emphasis in original).
85. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1237 (Wallace J., dissenting). See also Wong
Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896), which provides:
All persons within the territory of the United States are entitled to the protection
guaranteed by [the Fifth and Sixth] amendments, and that even aliens shall not be
held to answer for a capital or other infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a grand jury, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law.
Id. at 238.
86. The fifth amendment reads in pertinent part, "No person shall be held to answer
for a capital or otherwise infamous crime unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand
jury... "
87. The sixth amendment reads in pertinent part, "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial . . ."
88. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1237 (Wallace, J., dissenting). See also supra
notes 55-59.
89. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1224.
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as restricting the application of the fourth amendment to a special
class of people. 90 The majority reasoned that "the language of the
amendment does not so limit 'people,' and we will not insert quali-
fying language into the amendment to limit its application in such
a fashion." 91
This reasoning is unsound for a number of reasons. First, the Su-
preme Court has stated that "the fact that all persons, aliens and
citizens alike, are protected by the Due Process Clause does not
lead to the further conclusion that all aliens are entitled to enjoy all
the advantages of citizenship." '92 The Supreme Court said this was
so because "a host of constitutional and statutory provisions rest on
the premise that a legitimate distinction between citizens and aliens
may justify attributes and benefits for one class not accorded to the
other."93
Second, no United States constitutional amendment has language
limiting its scope except for the terms of each particularized
amendment. For example, in different amendments, the framers of
the Constitution spoke in terms of "the people,""' "the accused,""
"citizens," 96 and "all persons."' 97 No qualifying language is needed
to determine their intent. Juxtaposition of terms, for instance, "all
persons" versus "the people," and "citizens" versus "all persons,"
makes clear to whom they apply. As the Supreme Court, when in-
terpreting the Constitution, has reiterated, "the language of the
Constitution, where clear and unambiguous, must be given its plain
evident meaning. 98
Third, the extension of fifth and sixth amendment protection to
aliens is due in large part to the fact that any violation of such
constitutional rights would occur within the United States.99 "Un-
like the right to a jury trial or due process of law, fourth amend-
ment violations do not occur at trial.""' "Violations of the Fourth
Amendment occur at the time the government intrudes unreasona-
90. Id. at 1223. See also supra note 60.
91. id.
92. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78 (1976).
93. Id.
94. For example, the preamble, first amendment, second amendment, fourth amend-
ment, ninth amendment, and tenth amendment.
95. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
96. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
97. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
98. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
99. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
100. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1241 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
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bly into a citizen's legitimate sphere of privacy." 101 Moreover, there
is no independent violation of the fourth amendment when unlaw-
fully seized evidence is introduced into a criminal proceeding. 102
Verdugo-Urquidez is not one of "the people" to whom the fourth
amendment applies. Therefore, rather than extending the fourth
amendment to a non-resident foreign national for an action com-
mitted in a foreign country, the Verdugo-Urquidez majority should
have adhered to the Supreme Court's definitive admonition that:
Neither the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it
have any force in foreign territory unless in respect of our own
citizens; and operations of the nation in such territory must be
governed by treaties, international understandings and compacts,
and the principles of international law."0 3
VIII. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT DOES NOT PROHIBIT ALL
SEARCHES, ONLY UNREASONABLE SEARCHES
Assuming, arguendo, as the Verdugo-Urquidez majority did, that
the fourth amendment applies' 4 to the search of a foreign na-
tional's residence, what exactly does the fourth amendment
require? 10 5
The Verdugo-Urquidez majority held that the search of
Verdugo-Urquidez's Mexican residence required A warrant to be
reasonable.' 06 They reasoned, "the warrant requirement serves to
interpose a 'neutral and detached magistrate' between the public
and the police officer, who is 'engaged in the often competitive en-
terprise of ferreting out crime.' "1107 However, in the same breath,
the Verdugo-Urquidez majority recognized that "a warrant issued
by an American magistrate would be a dead letter in Mexico,'' 10 8
and that "international law enforcement is a cooperative venture
and it would be an affront to a foreign country's sovereignty if the
DEA presented an American warrant."' 0 9 Nevertheless, the major-
101. Id. (citing U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984); United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974)).
102. Leon, 468 U.S. at 906; United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458-59, n.35 (1976).
103. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) (empha-
sis added).
104. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1228.
105. See supra note 56.
106. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1230.
107. Id. at 1229 (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449 (1971) (quot-
ing Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).
108. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1229.
109. Id. at 1230.
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ity still held the search to be unreasonable because the DEA did
not obtain this impotent warrant.
In reaching this conclusion, the Verdugo-Urquidez majority rea-
soned that, despite the geographic limitations on the validity of
American warrants, the government still has a duty to obtain a
search warrant for a search in a foreign country. "  "To do so
would be to treat foreign searches differently from domestic
searches.""'
[I]f the residence were located in the United States, we would
conclude that the evidence sought to be introduced in this case
would have to be suppressed because the government did not ob-
tain a warrant and no exigent circumstances existed. We can dis-
cern no logical reason to formulate a different rule just because
the residence to be searched happens to be in Mexico."'
In reaching this conclusion, the Verdugo-Urquidez majority ig-
nored the fact that the law does not require the doing of a futile act
or a futile gesture." 3
This reasoning is troubling. It is beyond question that in the
event United States agents searched a United States residence
without a warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances, the search
would be constitutionally unreasonable."" What the Verdugo-Ur-
quidez majority overlooked is that "the ability of United States
agents in a foreign country to take any action against a citizen of
that country often depends . . . on the authorization and coopera-
tion of the foreign government.""' 5 As guests acting with the for-
eign government's permission, U.S. officials are not in a position to
require the foreign government to recognize our constitution." 6 The
Verdugo-Urquidez majority's reasoning also ignores the reality that
"when [U.S. officials] conduct searches abroad . . . foreign officials
.. .decide the scope and reasonableness of any proposed search,
whether the search will occur at all, and under what conditions.""'
110. Id.
11. Id.
112. Id.
113. South Hollywood Hills Citizens Ass'n v. King Cty., 101 Wash. 2d 68, 677 P.2d
114 (1984). The futile gestures doctrine arises most often in the exhaustion of state remedies
cases. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is required before resort to the courts, but ex-
haustion is excused if resort to administrative procedure would be futile. Id. at 74. See also
Zylstra v. Piva, 85 Wash. 2d 743, 539 P.2d 823 (1975).
114. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 212 (1981).
115. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1248 (Wallace, J., dissenting, citing United
States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2nd. Cir. 1974)).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1249 (Wallace, J., dissenting). See also supra note 98.
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In light of this, it is unreasonable to require an admittedly invalid
warrant to legitimize an otherwise reasonable foreign search.
Furthermore, the Verdugo-Urquidez majority ignored the fact
that United States district judges generally possess no extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction to issue search warrants." 8
By its express language, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
41(A) requires the search warrant to be issued by a judge within
the district where the property is located." 9 Moreover, besides be-
ing of no force in Mexico, presently there is no district in the
United States from which a valid search warrant for Mexico could
be obtained. Therefore if the fourth amendment applies in these
situations, a reexamination of its requirements should be under-
taken, keeping in mind the Supreme Court's pronouncement that,
"there is no formula for the determination of reasonableness."'1 0
IX. BEYOND Verdugo-Urquidez
In setting standards to govern this issue, the Supreme Court
should adopt an operative, flexible framework rather than the "ri-
gidity often characteristic of constitutional adjudication."'' To-
ward this end, the author proposes a two-step test modeled after the
one used to review the legality of extraordinary apprehensions of
alleged law-breakers not present within the United States.'22 By do-
ing so, the Supreme Court could implement a practical and worka-
ble standard which protects both the public interest in law enforce-
ment, and reasonable private expectations of justice.
A. Extraordinary Apprehensions
The United States usually uses extradition treaties in order to
take custody of suspected lawbreakers outside its boundaries. 3
"International extradition is the legal process through which one
nation, upon request by another nation, apprehends and delivers to
the requesting nation, an individual within its borders who has been
118. Weinberg v. United States, 126 F.2d 1004, 1006 (1942).
119. Rule 41(A) entitled "Authority to Issue Warrant" provides: "A search warrant
authorized by this rule may be issued by a federal magistrate or a judge of a state court of
record within the district wherein the property or person sought is located, upon request of a
federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government." Id.
120. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1930).
121. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
122. See infra section IIC.
123. Abramovsky & Eagle, U.S. Policy in Apprehending Alleged Offenders Abroad:
Extradition, Abduction. or Irregular Rendition?, 57 OR. L. REV. 51 (1977-78).
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accused or convicted of a crime in the requesting nation."12 Gov-
ernments may, and in recent years the United States increasingly
has, resorted to extraordinary apprehensions,125 foregoing the extra-
dition process in order to obtain custody over such individuals. 26
There are two basic types of extraordinary apprehensions: abduc-
tions and irregular renditions. Abduction is the unilateral seizure of
a fugitive by officials of the apprehending nation without the coop-
eration or acquiescence of the government of the nation in which
the fugitive is located. 2 7 Irregular renditions are seizures accom-
plished by informal agreements between law enforcement agents of
the apprehending and asylum states whereby an individual is forci-
bly removed to the state of apprehension either through the cooper-
ation or acquiescence of officials of the asylum state." 8
The United States' position on extraordinary apprehensions dif-
fers depending upon whether the seizure was an abduction or an
irregular rendition. 29 Although extremely rare, unilateral abduc-
tions are deemed to be violations of customary international law,13
which is considered part of American law. 131 Therefore abductions
are usually redressable by the return of the abducted individual. 3
On the other hand, irregular renditions have not been proscribed by
124. Note, Extradition Treaty Improvements to Combat Drug Trafficking, 15 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 285 (1985) [hereinafter Note].
125. The United States is not the only nation which has resorted to extraordinary
apprehensions in an effort to obtain custody over persons accused of a crime who have either
obtained refuge in other countries, or who have committed their acts outside the territorial
boundaries of the requesting state. For example, in the landmark Eichmann case, the District
Court of Jerusalem held: "It is an established rule of law that a person . . . tried for an
offense against the laws of a state may not oppose his trial by reason of the illegality of his
arrest or of the means whereby he was brought within the jurisdiction of that State." Attor-
ney-General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5, 59 C.D. Jerusalem, Israel 1961, affid 36
I.L.R. 304 L.S. Ct. Israel (1962). For a more detailed list of countries and cases which have
also followed this principle, as well as a more exhaustive article on extraordinary apprehen-
sions, see Abramovsky & Eagle, supra note 123.
126. Abramovsky & Eagle, supra note 123, at 51.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Note, supra note 124, at 301.
130. Generally, customary international law governs where a federal statute or judicial
decision does not provide otherwise. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 667, 700 (1900).
131. "International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered
by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction." Id. at 700. "Abduction is such a mani-
festly extralegal act, and in practice so hazardous and uncertain, that it is unworthy of seri-
ous consideration as an alternative method to extradition in securing custody of fugitive of-
fenders." l.A. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 75 (1971).
132. "Abductions by one state of persons located within the territory of another violate
the territorial sovereignty of the second state and are redressable usually by the return of the
person kidnapped." U.S. v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 278 (2d Cir. 1974). For more on Tos-
canino, see infra notes 145-61 and accompanying text.
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customary international law.' To the contrary, some United
States courts have expressly held that irregular renditions are con-
sistent with international law.'3 Before a court will divest itself of
jurisdiction for an irregular rendition, there must also be a violation
of the person's due process rights.'3 5
1. The Legality of Extraordinary Apprehension
In the landmark case of Ker v. Illinois,"6 the United States Su-
preme Court first evaluated the legality of extraordinary apprehen-
sion methods. The defendant in Ker, then residing in Peru, was in-
dicted in Illinois for embezzlement and larceny. 37 Ker contested on
the ground that his removal to Illinois violated the United States
extradition treaty with Peru. "'
The Supreme Court rejected this. The Court stated that the exis-
tence of a bilateral treaty does not mean that obtaining physical
custody over an alleged offender without recourse to the treaty vio-
lates its provisions. The Court conceded that the treaty had not
been followed and that Ker had been kidnapped. 3 9 However, the
Court affirmed his conviction, holding that forcible abduction does
not negate U.S. jurisdiction over the person, as long as the person is
properly indicted and given a fair trial."0
Sixty-six years later the conclusion in Ker was reaffirmed by the
Supreme Court in Frisbie v. Collins."1 "Thus, under the . . .Ker-
Frisbie rule, due process was limited to the guarantee of a constitu-
tionally fair trial, regardless of the method by which jurisdiction
133. Abramovsky & Eagle, supra note 123, at 64.
134. U.S. ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975).
135. Id. at 68.
136. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
137. Id. at 438.
138. Id. at 439. Ker argued that his Peruvian residence accorded him a right to asy-
lum, and that he could only be removed from Peru in accordance with the provisions of the
treaty.
139. Id. at 442-43.
140. Id. at 440.
141. 342 U.S. 519 (1952). In Frisbie, the defendant argued that because he was un-
lawfully apprehended in Illinois by Michigan law enforcement officials, his conviction in
Michigan was obtained in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Id. at 521. The Court disagreed:
This court has never departed from the rule announced in Ker . . .that the power
of a court to try a person for crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been
brought within the court's jurisdiction by reason of a 'forcible abduction'. . . . Due
process of law is satisfied when one present in court is convicted of crime after being
fairly apprized of the charges against him and after a fair trial in accordance with
constitutional procedural safeguards.
Id. at 522.
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was obtained over the defendant."
2. Modern Rulings on Extraordinary Apprehension
In United States v. Toscanino, the Second Circuit Court of ap-
peals reexamined the Ker-Frisbie doctrine.148 Toscanino, an Italian
citizen, was convicted of conspiracy to import narcotics into the
United States."" On appeal, Toscanino did not claim any error
with the trial itself. Instead, he claimed the entire district court
proceedings against him were void because his presence within the
court's jurisdiction was illegally obtained. " 5
Toscanino alleged that he was lured from his home in Monte-
video, Uruguay, at the urging of a Montevideo policeman acting as
a paid United States agent.14 6 Toscanino claimed that when he met
the agent, he was knocked unconscious by a gun, thrown into a car,
blindfolded, and driven to Brazil.14 7
Once in the custody of Brazilians, Toscanino was tortured and
interrogated for seventeen straight days.14 8 Following this period of
torture, Toscanino alleged that he was drugged by Brazilian-Amer-
ican agents and placed on a flight "destined for the waiting arms of
the United States government." 14 9 "The government prosecutor
neither affirmed nor denied these allegations, but claimed they were
immaterial to the district court's power to proceed. 1 50 While ac-
knowledging the strict judicial adherence to the Ker-Frisbee doc-
142. U.S. v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 272.
143. 500 F.2d 267 (1974).
144. Id. at 268.
145. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 269.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 270. Throughout this period, the United States government and the United
States Attorney for the eastern district of New York prosecuting this case were aware of the
interrogation, and in fact received progress reports. Id. In addition, Toscanino claimed his
captors:
Denied him sleep . . . for days at a time. Nourishment was provided intravenously
in a manner precisely equal to an amount necessary to keep him alive. . . .Tos-
canino was forced to walk up and down a hallway for eight hours at a time. When
he could no longer stand, he was kicked and beaten but all in a manner contrived to
punish without scarring. When he would not answer, his fingers were pinched with
metal pliers. Alcohol was flushed into his eyes and nose and other fluids . . . were
forced up his anal passage. Incredibly, these agents of the United States government
attached electrodes to Toscanino's earlobes, toes, and genitals. Jarring jolts of elec-
tricity were shot throughout his body, rendering him unconscious for indeterminate
periods of time but again leaving no physical scars.
149. Id. Toscanino's apprehension also violated two international agreements. For a
discussion of the importance of the violation of international agreements in Toscanino, as
well as in other cases, see infra notes 161-62.
150. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 270.
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trine in similar cases, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals applied
an expanded concept of due process which was first laid down by
the Supreme Court in Rochin v. California:151
It has long since ceased to be true that due process of law is heed-
less of the means by which otherwise relevant and credible evi-
dence is obtained .... Due process of law, as a historic and
generative principle, precludes defining, and thereby confining,
these standards of conduct more precisely than to say that convic-
tions cannot be brought about by methods that offend 'a sense of
justice.' 152
The Toscanino court concluded: "We view due process as now re-
quiring a court to divest itself of jurisdiction over the person of a
defendant where it has been acquired as the result of the govern-
ment's deliberate, unnecessary and unreasonable invasion of the ac-
cused's constitutional rights."' 3
Applying this standard to the facts in Toscanino, the court held
that if the defendant could prove that United States agents en-
gaged in reprehensible conduct which deprived him of due process
of law, the district court would have to divest itself of jurisdiction
over him.154
A year later in United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler,"' the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals'16 clarified the scope of Tos-
canino.15 1 In Lujan, the court held that "in recognizing that Ker
151. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
152. Id. at 172-73. In Rochin, sheriffs went to the petitioner's house with information
that he was selling narcotics. They entered the house through an open door, and forced open
the door to petitioner's bedroom. The sheriffs saw two capsules on a night stand, and when
they asked Rochin about them he put them in his mouth and swallowed them. Rochin was
taken to a hospital where the contents of his stomach were pumped, revealing that the cap-
sules contained morphine. Id. at 166.
153. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 275.
154. Id. at 275-76. On remand the district court held that the defendant failed to
prove his allegations. Therefore the court would not divest itself of jurisdiction. 398 F. Supp.
918 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
155. 510 F.2d 62 (1975).
156. The members of the Lujan panel also participated in Toscanino. Judge Oakes
concurred in Judge Mansfield's majority opinion in that case, and in a separate opinion
Judge Anderson concurred in the result.
157. Lujan was charged with conspiracy to import and distribute heroin. 510 F.2d at
63. According to the Second Circuit,
Lujan's arrest [warrant] commanded any special agent of the Drug Enforcement
Administration or United States Marshal . . . to bring him before the District
Court for the Eastern District of New York . . . Lujan, a licensed pilot, was hired
in Argentina by one Duran to fly him to Bolivia. Duran represented that he had
business to transact there with American interests in Bolivian mines . . . he in fact
had been hired by American agents to lure Lujan to Bolivia. When Lujan landed in
Bolivia . . . he was promptly taken into custody by Bolivian police who were [acting
solely as] paid agents of the United States. Lujan was not permitted to communi-
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and Frisbie no longer provided a carte blanche to government
agents bringing defendants from abroad to the United States by the
use of torture, brutality and similar outrageous conduct, we did not
intend to suggest that any irregularity in the circumstances of a
defendant's arrival in the jurisdiction would vitiate the proceedings
of the criminal court."15 8
The court then pointed out that the government conduct Lujan
complained of could not compare with that alleged by Toscanino. 159
While not intending to approve illegal government conduct, the Lu-
jan court felt compelled to recognize that, absent conduct like that
in Toscanino, not every violation by prosecutors or police requires
nullification of the indictment.1 60
The Lujan court further distinguished Lujan's case from Tos-
canino's. It is significant that in Toscanino, the court held that Tos-
canino's abduction violated the United Nations Charter"'1 and the
Charter of the Organization of American States, while Lujan's ab-
duction did not.16 2
cate with the Argentine embassy, an attorney, or any member of his family. [Six
days later] Bolivian police, acting together with American agents, brought Lujan to
the airport and placed him on plane headed to New York. Upon his arrival [in New
York], Lujan was formally arrested by federal agents. At no time had he been for-
mally charged by the Bolivian police, nor had a request for extradition been made
by the United States.
Id. at 63.
158. Id. at 65 (emphasis in original).
159. Id. at 66.
160. Id.
161. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 277. Article 2 paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter
provides: "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."
162. Article 17 of the Charter of the Organization of American States provides: "The
territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily of military occu-
pation or of other measures of force taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on any
grounds whatever. No territorial acquisitions or special advantages obtained either by force
or by other means of coercion shall be recognized."
As evidence that abductions would violate these agreements, Toscanino relied upon the
Eichmann incident. See supra note 125. In Eichmann, the United Nations Security Council
found that Argentina's sovereignty was. violated when Israel kidnapped the mass murderer
from Argentina in order to bring him to justice (510 F.2d at 66, 67). The Toscanino court
held a defendant might be able to interpose the violation of those charters as a defense to a
criminal prosecution. 500 F.2d at 276.
"Unlike Toscanino, Lujan fails to allege that either Argentina or Bolivia in any way pro-
tested or even objected to his abduction." 510 F.2d at 67. This lack of objection was deemed
fatal to Lujan's reliance upon the international charters. Id. "Thus, the failure of Bolivia or
Argentina to object to Lujan's abduction would seem to preclude any violation of interna-
tional law which might otherwise have occurred." Id. The court then definitively stated:
It only remains to be emphasized that by no means every irregularity in the recov-
ery of a fugitive from criminal justice is a 'recourse to measures in violation of
international law or international convention'. If the State in which the fugitive is
[Vol. 20
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B. Applying the Extraordinary Apprehension Doctrine to
Searches on Foreign Soil Involving a Foreign National's Own
Property
The framework analysis for extraordinary apprehensions of per-
sons not present within United States jurisdiction can readily be
extended by the Supreme Court to encompass foreign searches of
property, which are not within the scope of the fourth amendment.
The first inquiry in this analysis is: was there permission, coop-
eration or acquiescence from the host government, its officers or its
agents for the search? If the answer to this question is no, the in-
quiry ends. The unilateral search would be a violation of both inter-
national and U.S. law. 1 3 Therefore, the exclusion of the evidence
from trial would be required.
If there were permission, cooperation or acquiescence by the gov-
ernment or its officers or agents in whose nation the search oc-
curred, the second inquiry would be: did the search violate the de-
fendant's due process rights? At a minimum, this author believes
due process would require United States officials to make a good
faith effort to comply with the host nation's laws. By doing so, non-
resident aliens' reasonable expectations of justice would be pro-
tected. Beyond compliance with the host government's laws, atten-
tion should be paid to Supreme Court Justice Frankfurter's poign-
ant admonition that: "Due process of law, as a historic and
generative principle, precludes defining, and thereby confining,
these standards of conduct more precisely than to say that convic-
tions cannot be brought about by methods that offend 'a sense of
justice.' "164
CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court should overrule Verdugo-Ur-
quidez. When the United States acts in foreign nations, it is at
found acquiesces or agrees, through its officers or agents, to a surrender accom-
plished even in the most informal and expeditious way, there is no element of
illegality.
Id. The Lujan court went on to hold that since Lujan failed to allege "that Argentina or
Bolivia protested his abduction or that the apprehension involved abuse of the type ...
condemned in Toscanino, there is no justification for ordering the district court to divest
itself of jurisdiction over him." Id. at 68. Presently, therefore, before a court will divest itself
of jurisdiction based on an extraordinary apprehension, there must be either a violation of
international law or a violation of the person's due process rights.
163. See supra notes 129-131 and accompanying text.
164. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173.
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most a guest, subordinate to the paramount authority of the host
country. Both Supreme Court precedent and matters of principle
and practicality necessitate distinguishing between "the people" of
the United States and foreign nationals. When courts seek to im-
pose limits on the actions of the United States in other countries,
the extension of the fourth amendment's protections to foreign na-
tionals in foreign territories threatens unnecessarily to tie the hands
of United States officials who cooperate with foreign governments
to solve international crime. It is questionable whether any district
in the United States can validly authorize a search warrant for
searches abroad. In addition, because an American search warrant
is a legal nullity in foreign countries, a search warrant should not
be required. Instead, the search should be governed by the reasona-
bleness clause. In lieu of the Supreme Court extending the protec-
tion of the fourth amendment to foreign nationals abroad, foreign
nationals can be adequately protected by tenets of international law
and due process.
EPILOGUE
On February 28, 1990, after this article was completed, the
United States Supreme Court handed down their decision in United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez.16 5 In a majority opinion authored by
Chief Justice William Rehnquist"' the Supreme Court held that
the fourth amendment does not apply to search and seizure by
United States agents of property that is owned by a nonresident
alien located in a foreign country. 0 7
The Supreme Court, mirroring the analysis of Judge Wallace's
dissent in the Ninth Circuit decision, placed great weight on the
text of the fourth amendment. 6 ' That text, like the text of the first,
second, ninth and tenth amendments and unlike all the others, ap-
plies only to "the people." The Court noted that the Preamble de-
clares that the Constitution is ordained and established by "the
People of the United States." '69 The Court reasoned that while this
165. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990), overruling 856 F.2d
1214 (9th Cir. 1988).
166. Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White, O'Connor,
Scalia and Kennedy, J.J. joined. Kennedy, J., and Stevens, J., filed a concurring opinion.
Brennan, J., filled a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall, J., joined. Blackmun, J., also filed
a dissenting opinion.
167. 110 S. Ct. at 1059.
168. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
169. 110 S. Ct. at 1061.
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textual analysis is not conclusive, it suggests that "the People" pro-
tected by the fourth amendment "refers to a class of persons who
are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed
sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that
community." 170 Justice Stevens' concurrence stated that Verdugo
Urquidez's presence-lawful but involuntary-was not the sort of
presence which indicates any substantial connection with the
United States."' Justice Stevens' concurrence stated that at the
time of the search, Verdugo-Urquidez was a citizen and resident of
Mexico with no voluntary attachment to the United States. Since
the place searched was located in Mexico, the fourth amendment
had no application.' 72
It should be noted that Justice Kennedy's concurrence empha-
sized that a person in Verdugo-Urquidez's position can look to the
provisions of the fifth amendment's due process clause for his pro-
tections."' Quoting Justice Harlan, he stated: "the question of
which specific safeguards . . . are appropriately to be applied in a
particular context . . . can be reduced to the issue of what process
is 'due' a defendant in the particular circumstances of a particular
case."'
1 74
Justice Stevens felt that aliens lawfully within the United States
are among those "people who are entitled to the protection of...
the fourth amendment.' 75 Therefore, he could not join in the
Court's "sweeping opinion. "176 However, he agreed that the search
conducted by U.S. agents with the approval and cooperation of the
Mexican authorities was not "unreasonable."' 77 He felt that the
warrant clause of the fourth amendment had no application to
searches of non-citizens' homes in foreign jurisdictions because
American magistrates have no power to authorize such searches.
However, searches are still required to be reasonable.
This Note endorses the majority opinion that the fourth amend-
ment does not apply to the search and seizure by United States
agents of property which is owned by a non-resident alien and lo-
cated in a foreign country. Therefore, in order to guide future ac-
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1068.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. (Quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. at 75).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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tions of U.S. officials in similar situations, this author suggests im-
plementing a two-step test modeled after the one used to review the
legality of extraordinary apprehensions of the foreign person.
Patrick Dooley
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